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Abstract 
This paper was originally written for Clare McGovern’s Political Science 151 course The 
Administration of Justice. The assignment asked students to construct a logical and reasoned argument 
in four pages or less on a topic that has to do with the Canadian legal system, the one in which I 
chose was about whether or not judges in Canada should be elected. The paper uses APA citation 
style. 
 
Regardless of our traditional respect for the courts many today question the legitimacy of the courts 
decisions and call for some form of judicial accountability, where judges need to answer to the 
public in some way to maintain the legitimacy of their decisions, which stands in stark contrast to 
the nature of Canada’s judicial independence (Haussegger et al, 2015). After all, the courts have 
made many controversial decisions that oppose what the public deems right for their society. Look 
no further than R v Daviault (1994) as an example. To this, many people, such as Minkow (2010), 
suggest that the best course of action is to have judges be elected to their posts. However, one must 
be wary of the large and numerous potential negatives that come with judicial elections. It is because 
of the harmful implications on both judges and the court system as a whole that judicial elections 
should not occur in Canada, while many claims in support of such elections can be dismissed.  
There are two major implications on judges when having to participate in elections. The first 
is that an election creates a heavily politicized atmosphere separated upon ideology, and therefore 
will cause judges to become more ideological in their campaign and their decision-making. This is 
cemented in Weiden (2011) through the judicial politicization theory where “a politicized judicial 
selection culture results in a greater tendency for judges to be chosen based on partisan and 
ideological grounds”(336). Continuing on that, Weiden (2011) then shows how the US court system 
is far more politicized, and also ideologically influenced, in comparison to that of Canada. What 
does this have to do with elections? The process of an election is one of the most politicizing events 
in our society as it puts people against each other based inherently on what their beliefs are. This 
ideological divide and decision-making within a court system is harmful because it not only creates 
an institution exactly the same as an elected Parliament, thereby making it useless, it also may cause 
judges to make bad decisions based on their beliefs and not what the law says. 
The second implication is that it may cause judges to make decisions in favour of the majority 
of the public opinion, regardless of the implications or intended meaning of a law, especially if an 
election is approaching. Some may point to decisions such as the controversial R v Daviault (1994) 
decision to say this is a good thing, but what if the case involved a systematically oppressed minority 
such as an Aboriginal-Canadian. Whether consciously or unconsciously, discrimination against 
Aboriginals in Canada still exists today, and this is reflected in public opinion regarding cases 
involving an Aboriginal individual. If, for example, an Aboriginal was brought before a judge who 
Mitchell Robinson                                                                                                                                                         2 
 
SLC Writing Contest – 2018   
                                   
   
had an election coming up and the individual was already perceived guilty by a large part of society, 
the judge may decide to vote guilty as well to gain favour of the public. It is also shown that judges 
in the US tend to give harsher punishment, possibly even maintaining a death sentence, to offenders 
close to an election (Haussegger et al, 2015). This is because “judges facing competitive elections 
were more likely to vote with the majority and avoid unpopular dissents on politically sensitive 
issues” (Haussegger et al, 2015, 168). Appointed judges do not have such concerns and can 
therefore make these types of unpopular but necessary decisions.  
Further examination beyond the impacts on individual judges shows how judicial elections 
will also negatively impact the judicial system as a whole. First, elections will draw the attention of 
judges away from the courtroom to focus on their campaign. This would create a large backlog of 
cases in an already packed system. For example, in the 2011-2012 year the s.92 “Ontario Court of 
Justice heard almost 4.9 million ‘events’” (Haussegger et al, 2015, 40). If judges have to do anything 
other than focus on this large number of cases then most will not be heard. Even in higher courts 
like a provincial court of appeal or the Supreme Court of Canada, where every case holds a lot more 
significance due to their constitutional nature, every case that is not heard can have major 
implications for our society and our rights.  
Second, with every campaign there is donations, and it is possible that major donors could use 
their money to exploit judges and their decisions. Take the Supreme Court of Canada for example, 
which has the power to choose around 70 to 85 percent of the cases that it hears (Haussegger et al, 
2015). If a very wealthy individual or large corporation has a case being presented to the court, or is 
waiting for a case to be heard by the court, and it has given large sums of money to members elected 
to the court, this individual or corporation could use its donation to exploit and extort judges to hear 
its case and decide in its favour. If the judge hopes to be elected again they may rely on this 
individual or corporations donation to finance their campaign and will thus do what is asked of 
them, the same way it works for elected politicians. 
 Despite these many reasons against elected judges in Canada, there are still three arguments 
that people make to support this reform. First, judges make bad decisions, such as R v Daviault 
(1994) that gave defendants the right to use “extreme intoxication” as a defence, and are not held 
responsible. In response to this, the majority of such cases can be overcome by s.1 of the Charter of 
Rights and Freedoms that allows the government to put restriction on certain rights if it can 
justifiably demonstrate reasonable limits. If the court still rules against the government and the 
public and makes a bad decision, such as with R v Daviault (1994), the government still has the ability 
to amend its laws so to make them constitutional under a reference, such as what the government 
did in quick response to R v Daviault (1994). These systems that are in place in Canada still allow the 
public to have a say in trials even if judges are appointed.  
 Yet critics will respond further, pointing out a second problem about the particular lack of 
responses available to the governments to check judicial power. There are really only two ways 
governments can check judicial power: s.1 and s.33 (the ‘notwithsanding’ clause) of the Charter. 
Even within these two, critics such as Morton (2001) argue flaws. To s.1 critics say that since the 
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courts actually get the final say on whether a law is justified or not “any half-clever judge can use 
procedural objections as a pretence to strike down legislation that he opposes for more substantive 
reasons” (Morton, 2011, 113). As well, to respond to s.33, Morton (2001) states that the costs of 
using such a clause is very politically high and relatively frowned upon by the media and public, in 
other words, it’s not really a viable option. However, the courts often lay out what the government 
can do to justify the use of s.1, such as what happened in R v Daviault (1994), where it can then make 
a new lay that will be justified. As well, in regards to s.33, even though it may not be popular to use a 
lot of the time, it can be when certain scenarios call for it, such as when Quebec used it on Bill-101 
after being struck down by the SCC in Ford v Quebec (1998). Therefor, the ability of governments to 
challenge bad decisions or follow public support on a bill is still readily available if the political will 
exists. If there isn’t the will to do so then it is probably best to leave the decision in the hands of the 
courts, and the Charter, anyways.   
Third, “the court system is no better at deciding what our rights are or should be than are the 
elected executive and legislative branches of government” (Minkow, 2010, 40) and therefore the 
“non-elective nature of the judiciary...undermines our democratic character”(40). The response to 
Minkow (2010) is simple: courts like the Supreme Court of Canada make decisions based only on 
our society’s most coveted document, the Constitution, and thus serve as a crucial component to 
our democracy by holding our elected officials accountable to said document, and in turn protecting 
individuals in our society. Our Constitution exists above that of politics and subjecting the judges to 
elections and politicizing them will only taint the Constitution’s reputation. 
Due to the negative impact on judges and the court system listed above Canada cannot allow 
our judiciary to be subject to elections. The government has made numerous mistakes itself. 
Without the ability of the court to correct its mistakes, without consequence, such action could have 
continued to affect minorities in Canada who are not represented. and need the courts protection 
the most. An appointed court is the only way to maintain the independence necessary to protect 
everyone in our society.  
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